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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 12-3985 
___________ 
 
SOLIMAN A. YOUSSEF, 
     Appellant 
 
v. 
 
DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND SENIOR SERVICES;  
ROBIN SPAULDING-SMITH; KEVIN JENNINGS 
____________________________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the District of New Jersey 
(D.C. Civil Action No. 3:10-cv-00209) 
District Judge:  Honorable Peter G. Sheridan 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
April 22, 2013 
 
Before: AMBRO, HARDIMAN and ALDISERT, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed:  April 24, 2013 ) 
___________ 
 
OPINION 
___________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
 After we remanded Soliman A. Youssef‟s case for further proceedings, the 
defendants moved for summary judgment in their favor.
1
  As to defendant Spaulding-
                                              
1
 As the parties are familiar with the background of this case, which we previously 
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Smith, the District Court dismissed any remaining claim against her because Youssef had 
not amended his complaint after our remand (and indicated no intention to do so).  The 
District Court also ruled that Youssef‟s remaining claims were barred by the doctrine of 
res judicata.  Youssef appeals. 
 We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  Our review of the District 
Court‟s decision is plenary, as is our review of any other questions of law, such as 
whether the District Court properly interpreted our mandate on remand (which is an issue 
that Youssef raises).  See Abramson v. William Patterson Coll. of N.J., 260 F.3d 265, 276 
(3d Cir. 2001); Kilbarr Corp. v. Business Sys., 990 F.2d 83, 87-88 (3d Cir. 1993). 
 We conclude that the District Court did not err in determining that no claim 
remained against Spaulding-Smith in her individual capacity.  We previously upheld the 
dismissal of the claims against her in her individual capacity under Title VII of the Civil 
Rights Act of 1964 (“Title VII”), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. and the Age Discrimination 
in Employment Act of 1967 (“ADEA”), 29 U.S.C. § 621 et seq.  At that point, we also 
directed the District Court to permit Youssef the opportunity to amend his complaint to 
clarify any claim against Spaulding-Smith under 42 U.S.C. § 1981.  The District Court 
reopened proceedings pursuant to our remand.  However, Youssef did not amend his 
complaint.
2
 
                                                                                                                                                  
described in Youssef v. Department of Health & Senior Services, 423 F. App‟x 221 (3d 
Cir. 2011), we will present the facts only to the extent they are relevant to our decision. 
 
2
 Youssef seems to understand our earlier opinion to mean that he stated a claim under 
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 The District Court properly granted summary judgment on the remaining claims 
on res judicata grounds.  Youssef contends that the District Court could not even consider 
the issue in light of our earlier opinion in his case.  We do not read our earlier decision as 
disallowing a decision in the District Court on res judicata grounds.  We noted the open 
question relating to the applicability of res judicata principles in this case, see Youssef, 
423 F. App‟x at 223 (citing Rycoline Prods., Inc. v. C&W Unlimited, 109 F.3d 883, 889 
n.2 (3d Cir. 1997), but we suggested that the District Court could consider it when we 
remanded the matter for further proceedings, see id. at 224. 
 Res judicata encompasses two preclusion concepts – issue preclusion, which 
forecloses litigation of a litigated and decided matter, and claim preclusion (often referred 
to as direct or collateral estoppel), which disallows litigation of a matter that has never 
been litigated but which should have been presented in an earlier suit.  See Migra v. 
                                                                                                                                                  
§ 1981 in his original complaint.   However, we noted that he made a reference to § 1981, 
and we held that the District Court should have given him leave to amend “[t]o the extent 
the District Court was unable to discern . . . whether Youssef was raising a § 1981 claim 
against Spaulding-Smith.”  Youssef, 423 F. App‟x at 224.  Furthermore, any Title VII 
and ADEA claims against the individual defendants were properly dismissed because 
they are barred for the reasons we cited in discussing the case against Spaulding-Smith in 
our earlier opinion.  See id.; see also Erie Telecomms. v. City of Erie, 853 F.2d 1084, 
1089 n.10 (3d Cir. 1988) (holding that we may affirm on an alternative basis supported 
by the record).  Also, the ADEA claims for damages could not go forward against the 
agency or the individual defendants in their official capacities, as the defendants argued 
in their motion for summary judgment.  See Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 
91 (2000).  The defendants also contended that Youssef pursues claims that were subject 
to a settlement agreement in earlier litigation.  It is unclear if he pursues those claims so 
much as describes them as background for his more recent claims.  In any event, those 
older claims that were dismissed pursuant to a settlement agreement cannot be relitigated. 
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Warren City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., 465 U.S. 75, 77 n.1(1984).  Where defendants 
invoke the doctrine in a federal case in reliance on an earlier state-court judgment, 
“Congress has specifically required all federal courts to give preclusive effect to state-
court judgments whenever the courts of the State from which the judgments emerged 
would do so.”  Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 96 (1980) (citing the Full Faith and Credit 
Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1738).  Accordingly, if the New Jersey state courts would give 
preclusive effect to the Superior Court judgment that became final after Youssef filed his 
complaint in this action, then we (and the District Court) must do so as well. 
 New Jersey applies the entire controversy doctrine, a “specific[] and idiosyncratic” 
version of traditional res judicata principles.  Rycoline Prods., Inc., 109 F.3d at 886.  The 
entire controversy doctrine requires a litigant to bring all related claims
3
 in a single action 
“against a particular adversary or be precluded from bringing a second action based on 
the omitted claims against that party.”  In re Mullarkey, 536 F.3d 215, 229 (3d Cir. 2008) 
(citation and quotation marks omitted).  A litigant cannot withhold part of a controversy, 
even a separate and independent cause of action, for later litigation.  See id.  The 
equitable doctrine, which is flexibly applied, does not “bar component claims that are 
                                              
3
 After reviewing the record, including Youssef‟s federal and state complaints and the 
voluminous exhibits submitted at various stages by the parties, we agree with the District 
Court that the claims Youssef raised in federal court are related to the claims he brought 
in state court.  The core facts in both actions are the same and relate to the “same 
transaction or series of transactions.”  Fornarotto v. Am. Waterworks Co., 144 F.3d 276, 
279 (3d Cir. 1998) (quoting DiTrolio v. Antiles, 662 A.2d 492, 502 (N.J. 1995)). 
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unknown, unarisen, or unaccrued at the time of the original action.”  Id.  However, a 
litigant whose related claim arises while the first action is pending “risks its loss unless 
he apprises the court and his adversary of its existence and submits to judicial discretion 
the determination of whether it should be joined in that action or reserved.”  Viviano v. 
CBS, Inc., 597 A.2d 543, 550-51 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1991) (quoting Brown v. 
Brown, 506 A.2d 29, 34 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1986) for the general rule).  To 
“apprise” the court, the litigant is obligated to seek leave to file a supplemental pleading 
pursuant to Rule 4:9-4 of the New Jersey Rules that govern civil practice in the New 
Jersey Superior Court.  Brown, 506 A.2d at 33-34.  Pursuant to Rule 4:9-4, the proposed 
supplemental proceeding must accompany the motion for leave to file it. 
In this case, the parties do not dispute that while a motion for summary judgment 
was pending in the state case, Youssef received a “right-to-sue” letter from the Equal 
Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) regarding his federal claims, and his 
counsel brought the letter to the state court‟s attention.4  Youssef more specifically 
contended that his counsel brought the new claims to the state court‟s attention and 
“asked for [the trial judge‟s] advice of what his Honor may decide.”  “Brief and Legal 
Argument in support of Plaintiff‟s Opposition to Defendants‟ Motion for Summary 
Judgment” (Ex. 5 to District Court Docket Entry No. 77) at 5.  However, he did not put 
                                              
4
 For the purposes of our analysis, we will assume that Youssef‟s federal claims “arose” 
at this point. 
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forth proof to controvert the defendants‟ contention that the extent of counsel‟s efforts 
was the attachment of the EEOC‟s decision to a letter to the court that stated, “In 
anticipation of your ruling on the pending summary judgment motion . . ., I thought you 
should be aware of the attached EEOC probable cause determination.”  Defendants‟ 
Motion for Summary Judgment, Ex. F at 1.  Accordingly, on the record before us, 
Youssef did not satisfy the requirements set forth in Brown.  See 506 A.2d at 33-34. 
However, one last question remains about the applicability of the entire 
controversy doctrine because Youssef did not initiate his federal suit after the conclusion 
of his state court suit.  He opened the federal action while the state action was pending.
5
  
As we noted previously, “[i]n Rycoline, we specifically left open the question whether, 
„where two actions are pending simultaneously, the Entire Controversy Doctrine may be 
raised at the time one action is concluded to preclude completely the other action.‟”  
Youssef, 423 F. App‟x at 223 (quoting 109 F.3d at 889 n.2).  Since we decided Rycoline, 
the New Jersey Superior Court has provided further guidance on the issue.  The state 
court clarified that its rulings that stated or implied that the entire controversy doctrine 
precluded only successive suits about related claims, see, e.g., Kaselaan & D‟Angelo 
Assocs., Inc. v. Soffian, 675 A.2d 705, 708 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1996), did not 
foreclose the application of the doctrine after one of two simultaneously pending suits 
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 As the parties know, the state court action proceeded to a final judgment on the merits, 
which Youssef did not appeal. 
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concluded.  See Archbrook Laguna, L.L.C. v. Marsh, 997 A.2d 1035, 1041 (N.J. Super. 
Ct. App. Div. 2010).  Because Youssef could have asserted in his state court action the 
claims he raised in federal court,
6
 because the state court had jurisdiction to hear them, 
and because the state court reached a judgment on the merits in his earlier action, we 
conclude that New Jersey would give preclusive effect to the state court judgment 
reached after a jury trial.  Cf. id.  Accordingly, the District Court was correct in holding 
that res judicata applied. 
For these reasons, we conclude that the District Court properly granted summary 
judgment in favor of the defendants.  We will affirm the judgment. 
                                              
6
 Youssef could have done so even if only for the state court to determine whether he 
should have been permitted to file a supplemental pleading. 
